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A

DECENT RESPECT TO THE OPINIONS

OF MANKIND SOMETIMES REQUIRES

A SECOND LOOK
Chief Judge Robert Henry*

It is futile to think, as extreme nationalists do, that we can have an
international law that is always working on our side. And it is futile
to think that we can have international courts that will always render
the decisions we want to promote our interests. We cannot successfully cooperate with the rest of the world in establishing a reign of
law unless we are prepared to have that law sometimes operate
against what would be our national advantage. In our internal affairs
we have come to rely upon the judicial process to settle individual
controversies and grievances and even those between states of the
Union, not because courts always render right judgments, but because the consequences of wrong or unwise decisions are not nearly
so evil as the anarchy which results from having no way to obtain any
decision of such questions; in which case each will take the law into
his own hands. And in a somewhat similar sporting spirit we must
look upon any international tribunal, not as one whose decision always will be welcome or always right or wise. But the worst settlement of international disputes by adjudication or arbitration is likely
to be less disastrous to the loser and certainly less destructive to the
world than no way of settlement except war. And we will not suffer
the worst of decision but will benefit from the judicial process at its
best if we insist upon the independence and intellectual integrity of
any international tribunal which purports to arbitrate or adjudicate
controversies between states.'
- Justice Robert H. Jackson, April 13, 1945.
*

Judge Henry wishes to thank Chris Borgen, Janet Levit, Margaret McGuinness,

Sean Murphy, and Joseph Thai for their comments on earlier drafts.

1. Justice Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Supreme Court, Address at the Thirty-Ninth An-

nual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 13, 1945), in A DECENT
RESPECT TO THE OPINIONS OF MANKIND: SELECTED SPEECHES BY JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT ON FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

U.S.

27, 40 (Christopher J. Borgen
ed., 2007). The rest of the quotation, which ends his speech, is also of interest:
I always have found a great measure of professional pride and inspiration in
the story I have heard and often repeated about Lord Alverstone. In the
Alaskan Boundary dispute between the United States and Great Britain, an
arbitration commission was set up, consisting of an equal number of nationals of each. Of course no decision could be reached unless at least one arbitrator voted against the interests of his own country. It so happened that
Lord Alverstone, named to the commission by Great Britain, joined in an
award in favor of the United States. The storm of criticism among his countrymen was fierce. The answer attributed to Alverstone embodied in few
words about all that I have taken a half hour to say. It was an attitude fol-
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important and legendary lawyer and jurist, the late Judge Irving L.
Goldberg.
A founder
of one
nation's
premier law firms-now
am very honored
indeed
to beofatour
a lecture
memorializing
a singularly
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld-he was, in the words of the New
York Times, "one of the Federal judiciary's strongest links to the civil
rights era."'2 In twenty-nine years on the bench, he ruled on cases ranging
from school desegregation to his important decision in Rodriguez v. San
Antonio Independent School District,in which he advanced the positionokay, he held-that education was a fundamental right. 3 As Drew Days,
III, noted in his 2001 Goldberg Lecture, the Supreme Court reversed
Judge Goldberg by a 5-4 vote, but constitutional scholars and policy makers still debate the issue strenuously. 4 I did not have the opportunity to
know Judge Goldberg, but two great judges that I admire have taught me
about him. My good friend Judge Diane Wood, one of our more highly
regarded appellate jurists in this country, told me last week of her glorious experiences working for the Judge. She commented on his raconteurship, specifically referencing his stories of trying "bug in the bottle
cases"-a phenomenon that plagued the Lone Star State for some time
when exceptionally high numbers of various small arthropods seemed to
find their way into bottled beverages. Diane also told me that perhaps
the greatest experience she garnered from Judge Goldberg was that being
a judge is first and foremost about the people whose cases you are
adjudicating.
In the inaugural Goldberg lecture, Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. also
returned to the theme of justice when he referenced Aristotle's definition
of a judge to talk about Judge Goldberg. 5 To Aristotle, a judge was supposed to "do" justice. 6 But we modern judges indeed are in the law busilowed by Mr. Justice Van Devanter, who joined in deciding a later arbitration
against the United States. It is, I think, the shortest explanation of the success
with which this country and Great Britain for well over a century have been
able to settle their differences by peaceful means. Alverstone's reply to criticism was simply, "If when any kind of arbitration is set up they don't want a
decision based on the law and the evidence, they must not put a British judge
on the commission." That is the spirit in which disputes between states or
between individuals must be decided, and the spirit in which decisions must
be accepted, if the world is ever truly to be ruled by law instead of by the
wills of men in power.
Id. at 41.
2. Richard Perez Pena, I.L. Goldberg, 88, U.S. Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1995, at

B7.
3. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 282 (W.D. Tex.
1971).

4. See Drew S.Days, III, In Search of EducationalE/Quality Forty-Six Years After
Brown v. Board of Education, 54 SMU L. REV. 2089, 2089 (2001).
5. See Frank M. Johnson, Civilization, Integrity, and Justice: Some Observations on
the Function of the Judiciary, 43 Sw. L.J. 645, 651 (1989).
6. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 4, at 115 (D. Ross trans., 1966)
("[T]o go to the judge is to go to justice; for the nature of the judge is to be a sort of
animate justice"), quoted in Johnson, supra note 5, at 651 n.24; cf ROBERT ALTER, THE
FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES 89 (2004) ("Will not the Judge of all the earth do justice?" (trans-
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ness, not the justice business, and we are bound to follow the law and
justify our decisions under its rule. Sometimes, justice is not implicated in
a decision-it is a choice between two positions, neither more or less just
than the other. But when the pathways of law and justice diverged, Judge
Goldberg was the kind of judge who made certain that the law truly compelled his direction.
Of course, Judge Goldberg was also known for his sense of humor.
Illustrating that, he cited a variety of sources, even using a little "foreign"
law, as one of my favorite Goldbergisms demonstrates:
Counsel for Golden Panagia informed this court at oral argument
that Newell is now, in any event, dead. A Higher Court thus has
jurisdiction over Henry Newell, and we are confident that any sins he
may have committed will be dealt with appropriately there. See Mat7
thew 25:41-46 (explaining Final Judgment procedures).
Judge Goldberg made some tough and controversial decisions in his
remarkable career. This lecture series was created in his honor, signifying
the widespread agreement that his was a principled jurisprudence. The
path I advocate today is not nearly so difficult to determine. I am here at
a school noted for its interest and accomplishments in things foreign, international, and transnational. Not surprisingly, I should like to talk a bit
about such things. At the outset, let me note that I am not speaking
about pending cases, nor should positions I take in the academic environment be deemed to necessarily express my opinion should similar matters
come before me as a judge, nor do today's somewhat metaphysical
maneuverings represent positions of any committees, councils, or panels
of judges upon which I serve.
I will discuss three things today. In doing so, I want to offer for
thought what I consider a rather modest point: when we have international obligations and a manifestation by our President and the Department of State (or, as is often the case, several Presidents and several
Departments of State) to abide by them, we ought to find a way to uphold those obligations, regardless of whether we are compelled to do so
by law, judges, politics, or morals. (Although usually one or more of
these are implicated.)
First, I will discuss a bit of our historical love-hate relationship with
international cooperation, including that relationship's current seemingly
fussy tone, and why it was not always like that. Also, implicit in my talk
are some reasons why it may be good for us to band together with one
message in foreign relations contexts, even if it comes from several
lating Genesis 18:25)); MUHAMMAD ASAD, THE MESSAGE OF THE QURI AN 133 (2003)
("[A]nd whenever you judge between people, . . . judge with justice." (translating Sarah
4:58)); id. at 133 n.75 ("I.e., in the judicial sense, as well as in the sense of judging other
people's motives, attitudes and behaviour." (explaining Sarah 4:58)).
7. Golden Panagia S.S., Inc. v. Panama Canal Comm'n, 791 F.2d 1191, 1200 (5th Cir.

1986).
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voices. 8 We should have coherent policy in international relations because it is in our national interest, it shows respect for our own promises,
and it shows some respect for the international community.
Second, I will primarily discuss the Supreme Court opinion of Medellin
v. Texas9 but also touch on some other cases involving the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). Medellin and Torres v. Mullins,
another VCCR case, demonstrate two ways that states have resolved the
problem of how we might handle international obligations that do not
have clear legal remedies. 10
Third and finally, I will discuss where we are after these cases, and how
the picture may be brighter than it once appeared-that is, although we
do not have binding international law in the matter I will discuss, we are
at least moving in the direction of keeping our promises. In discussing
these matters, some will be disappointed that I avoid two controversial
topics, which I do not need to discuss to make my point. The two areas
that I choose to avoid are: first, the international debates on the death
penalty (the presence of which clearly played a role in foreign states' decade-plus efforts to litigate the VCCR cases); and, second, the debate
about whether the VCCR and other relevant documents are self-executing, and what the changes in the way we now examine that issue will
mean for the future (this is primarily the debate between Justice Breyer
and the Chief Justice in Medellin).1" These are interesting topics, to be
sure, but they await another day and a more competent speaker.
I.

AMERICAN DUALISM, EXCEPTIONALISM,
OR NATIONALISM?

Oddly, given reality, American politics of late seem to have an aversion
to international cooperation and coordination, especially if human rights
law is involved. I say reality because there has never been a time when
internationalism is more necessary. Examples abound where international cooperation is absolutely necessary: terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and the global economic crisis, which Dennis C. Blair, the Director
of National Intelligence and four-star admiral, recently advised Congress
12
was our most urgent national security threat.
8. By several voices, I primarily mean that states, and even localities, may properly
and legally play a role in foreign policy as long as it is not preempted or contrary to the
properly formulated national position. See Julian G. Ku, The Crucial Role of the States and
Private InternationalLaw Treaties: A Model for Accommodating Globalization, 73 Mo. L.
REV. 1063, 1063 (2008); see also Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 397 (2003)

(holding that Presidential agreements with Germany and other countries preempted California law regarding restitution for bad acts by Nazi insurance companies).
9. Medellfn v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
10. Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003).
11. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1391.
12. The New York Times earlier described Admiral Blair as "[a] brainy retired fourstar admiral" who had commanded the U.S. Pacific Command and served on the National
Security Council, as well as "an Asia expert" fluent in Russian. Mark Mazzetti, The New
Team: Dennis C. Blair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com2008/11/22/us/

politics/22web-blair.html. He stressed that global economic turmoil and the instability it
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One area where I am particularly happy to have international cooperation is in global disease surveillance and response programs-programs
like the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, which "has made a significant
impact on the prevalence of polio throughout the world. '13 But, of

course, there are other beasties (van Leeuwenhoek's word) 14 of more immediate concern than polio, which
SARS (Sudden Acute Respiratory
fever (this is a really good one to
intentional anthrax among them. 15

require strict international protocols:
Syndrome), Ebola viral hemorrhagic
avoid getting), West Nile virus, and
No one would doubt continued need

6
for international cooperation in these areas.1

Nonetheless, there does seem to be something at work in America that
is anti-international these days 7-a widespread near-antipathy towards
could ignite had outpaced terrorism as the most urgent threat facing the United States. It
was not terrorism, it was not nuclear proliferation (although these problems also require
international cooperation don't they), but rather the economic downturn was "the primary
near-term security concern, and he warned that if it continued to spread and deepen, it
would contribute to unrest and imperil some governments." Mark Mazzetti, Global Economic Crisis Poses Top Threatto U.S., Spy Chief Warns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, at A14
(emphasis added); see Walter Pinrus & Joby Warrick, FinancialCrisis Called Top Security
Threat to U.S., WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2009, at A14.
13. Penny Hitchcock et al., Challenges to Global Surveillance and Response to Infec-

tious Disease Outbreaks of InternationalImportance, 5 BIOSECURITY

AND BIOTERRORISM:

206, 220 (2007) (describing how outbreaks of Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), multidrug-resistant tuberculosis,
Ebola viral hemorrhagic fever, West Nile viral encephalitis, intentional anthrax, and H1N1
viral infections led to updates in the International Health Regulations). The article also
lists global surveillance and response organizations, noting achievements and areas requiring more improvement. Id. at 210-20.
14. Jonathan H. Esensten, Put Down That Toothbrush, HARV. CRIMSON, Sept. 26,
2002, http://www.thecrimson.com/articleaspx?ref=254216.
15. HITCHCOCK, supra note 8, at 206. Since the presentation of this lecture and before
its publication, swine flu has made the list; the World Health Organization declared this
form of flu a pandemic. See Press Release, Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org.,
World Now at the Start of the 2009 Influenza Pandemic (June 11, 2009), availableat http://
www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/hlnl-pandemic-phaseb-2009061/en/index.html.
16. A reporting of the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network stated:
We face challenges today that are beyond the capacity of any one nation
(even the United States) to solve: terrorism, infectious disease, climate
change, global economic imbalances. Working in cooperation with other
countries, international institutions and civil societies multiplies our strength,
expands our options, shares the costs and risks, and leverages our common
successes. We live in an interdependent world and thus need the respect and
support of others to safeguard our security, to work together on common
challenges and to show that our values and priorities have merit.
MODERNIZING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE NETWORK, NEW DAY NEW WAY: U.S. FOREIGN AsSISTANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 5-6 (2008).
17. In response to a question that "Chancellor Schroeder says international law must
apply in [the case of Iraq reconstruction contracts]. What's your understanding of the
law?" President Bush replied, "International law? I better call my lawyer. He didn't bring
that up to me." Remarks Following a Cabinet Meeting and an Exchange with Reporters,
BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRACTICE, AND SCIENCE,

39

WKLY. COMPILATION

PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

1765, 1782-83 (2003), available at

http://fdsys.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2003-12-15/html/WCPD-2003-12-15-Pgl782-2.htm.
I
do not mean to take some presidential humor out of context, but I think the President was
reflecting a view held in some circles that international law is less worthy of respect because it is not relevant in domestic politics.
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international cooperation, especially in the field of human rights, the
modern genesis of which our nation created in the Declaration of Independence,18 and later fostered in the United Nations Charter' 9 and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (drafted by a panel led by Eleanor Roosevelt). 20 This hostility or tension may be a by-product of our
virulent "dualism" in international law, a carryover from English common law, modified by our unique federalism. Dualism is the idea that
international law and domestic law are separate and distinct, operating on
different levels, and that international law can only be enforced in national law if it is incorporated (and perhaps now, incorporated very specifically-but I said I would not get into that) into our domestic law.
Perhaps, and more likely, it is, as Professor Margaret E. McGuinness
has persuasively described it, "American exceptionalism." '21 This idea,
first offered by Alexis de Toqueville (until recently, the last French intellectual to say something nice about us) is that:
[T]he United States, in its form of government and its institutions of
civil society, is unique and different from the rest of the world. Tocqueville cited the role of the judiciary in resolving political questions
as evidence of American exceptionalism in the 19th Century, famously observing that there "is virtually no political question in the
United States that does not sooner or later resolve itself into a judicial question." In its current incarnation, American exceptionalism
describes the ways in which the United States has set itself apart
from the rules governing much of the international system. The wisdom of this current type of exceptionalism-going it alone, ignoring
prior international commitments and working around
multilateral in22
stitutions-has itself become a political question.
Now, like so many other things, there is good exceptionalism and bad
exceptionalism 23 (and good natural law and bad natural law), and a
lengthy discussion is beyond today's scope and my ability. (Suffice for
present purposes that I favor good exceptionalism!) But some have
raised the following as examples of what they might call "iffy" exceptionalism: a reluctance to discuss international law; perhaps relatedly, a fear
of citing foreign law as merely persuasive or informational in opinions; a
concern by certain judicial elites about other "cosmopolitan" judicial

18. See THE

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

19. See U.N. Charter pmbl.
20. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, pmbl., at 71-72,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st Plan. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
21. Her important article is: Margaret E. McGuinness, Sanchez-Llamas, American
Human Rights Exceptionalism and the VCCR Norm Portal,11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 47
(2007).
22. Id. at 47 (citations omitted).
23. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1479 (2003).
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elites;2 4 and a worrisome revival of protectionism. 25 Though America is
certainly the good kind of exceptional in many ways, we see some evocation of American exceptionalism as hostility or reluctance to look at foreign law, and I think some of that may, intentionally or otherwise, rub off
on international law. But this fear of things foreign or international was
not always with us, as the epigram at the beginning of this paper quoting
Justice Robert Jackson indicates. 26 Justice Jackson is one of our heroic
figures in American law, and a figure whose name was positively evoked
27
in the confirmation hearings of two recent justices-the Chief Justice's
28
and Justice Alito's.
The views of our country's Nuremberg trial prosecutor reflect not only his wide reading but his experiences, and they are
worthy of thoughtful consideration. I reference in the title of my lecture
another demonstration of earlier respect for world opinion (and an attempt to cultivate world opinion in our favor), the preamble to the Declaration of Independence.
24.

RICHARD

29

A.

25. DAVID M.

POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 347 (2008).
MARCHICK & MATTHEW J. SLAUGHTER, GLOBAL FBI POLICY: COR-

DRIFT 3 (2008), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/
16503/. The summation is useful:
Foreign investment, though, is not immune to the sort of resistance that we
are seeing with respect to the movement of goods and services. Indeed, just
as with trade, calls to restrict investment are growing louder in many countries, with potentially significant adverse political and economic consequences. In this Council Special Report, David M. Marchick and Matthew J.
Slaughter track the rise of investment protectionism. They examine trends in
a number of countries, documenting moves toward restricting investment
through both legislation and regulation. They also analyze the reasons behind these trends, such as increased concern over investment from "nontraditional" sources, both private and sovereign wealth funds.
The report ends with recommendations for policymakers. Acknowledging
governments' legitimate national security interests, it lays out clear principles
for host countries to follow in regulating foreign investment. The authors also
recommend actions to be taken by international organizations to help foster
sound policies in these host countries. The result is a compelling analysis and
a strong case for governments everywhere to take steps to maintain openness
to investment.
Overview: Foreign Investment Has Been a Principle Engine of Global Economic Growth
in Recent Years, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16503 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
26. BORGEN, supra note 1, at 40. Professor Borgen's collection, along with his introduction and commentary, is an excellent means of seeing how distinguished Supreme
Court Justices, from Chief Justice Hughes, to Justices Robert Jackson, Sandra Day
O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, have viewed international law.
27. Confirmation Hearing of John Roberts: Hearing before the S. Judiciary Comm.,
109th Cong. (2005) (statement of John Roberts).
28. Confirmation Hearing of Samuel Alito: Hearing before the S. Jud. Comm., 109th
Cong. (2006) (statement of Sen. Kennedy, Member, S. Jud. Comm.).
29. According to the Declaration:
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to
dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to
assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to
which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, A DECENT RESPECT TO THE OPINIONS OF MANKIND requires that they should declare the
causes which impel them to the separation.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). In trying to
establish our right to be here, and perhaps to be Englishmen, Mr. Jefferson's charter is

RECTING A PROTECTIONIST
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Even if we might disagree as to whether we can learn from foreign
voices, we should agree that we ought to respect them. While international cooperation does not require respect, it works a lot better with it.
Joining with other nations, we can enter into mutually beneficial trade
agreements to open markets and improve our economy, or to develop
protocols that protect us from deadly diseases. We can deal with global
environmental crises, and global warming, if that's what's happening.
And, of course, we can protect our own citizens when they are abroad by
reciprocally protecting citizens of other nations when they visit us. Ideally, we can be the good kind of exceptional while respecting foreign
voices and upholding our obligations. As we shall see, it is not always as
simple as that in practice.
I am going to talk about two cases: one is the Medellin case, 30 which
with, and the other that I will talk
many of you are probably familiar
31
about briefly is the Torres case.
II.

MEDELLIN

There are many different ways to look at Medellfn. 32 Ilya Shapiro of
the Cato Institute called it "the Ultimate Law School Exam. '33 Janet
Koven Levit, a scholar in the field and Dean of the University of Tulsa
Law School, noted that Medellin "sent a shockwave through the international legal community. ' 34 A group of international and constitutional
scholars termed it, with admirable terseness, "ODD."
I will begin with a bit of background, specifically the ratification of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). 35 In 1969, the Senate consented to and the President ratified the Convention. 36 In Article
36, the Convention reciprocally gave nationals traveling abroad the right
to ask for assistance from their consulates when they are detained by foreign authorities. 3 7 As part of that right, Americans, and subjects of other
parties to the treaties, received the right to be notified of their right to
really a brief dedicated to world opinion. I see it as a demonstration of respect for world
opinion, although some appear to disagree. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, The Opinion of
Mankind, N.Y. SUN, July 1, 2005, at 9 ("[The Declaration does not say that] we learn from
others. Rather the Declaration seeks to teach other nations."). It seems to me that the
Declaration's intent was primarily to state its case for both Americans and the world to
see. Along with other missives, it sought to encourage other countries to help us and did
not do this by "teaching" them.
30. See Medellfn v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
31. See Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003).
32. See, e.g., Margaret E. McGuinness, Three Narratives of Medellfn v. Texas, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 227, 227 (2008) ("Every once in a while, a Supreme Court case
comes along that holds a mirror up to the changing face of the American polity.").
33. Ilya Shapiro, Medellfn v. Texas and the Ultimate Law School Exam, 2008 CATO
Sup. CT. REV. 63, 85.
34. Janet Koven Levit, Does Medellfn Matter?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 617, 617 (2008).
35. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR].
36. Id.
37. See id.
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38
confer with their consulates "without delay."
Additionally, in an Optional Protocol, the United States agreed to submit "'[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or application' of the
40
EstabConvention" 39 to the International Court of Justice or the ICJ.

lished in 1945 in the U.N. Charter, the International Court of Justice is
"the principal judicial organ of the United Nations"; 4 1 it is a sort of global
42
court with general jurisdiction over disputes among adhering nations.
In the U.N. Charter, each member of the U.N. "undertakes to comply
with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party."' 43 Only
nations can be parties to disputes before the ICJ. 44 Importantly, the
United States invoked the Optional Protocol in451979, suing Iran for taking fifty-two United States hostages in Tehran.
The VCCR Article 36 is simple to comply with in theory. When we
arrest people from foreign countries, we have to tell them, without delay,
that they have the right to ask for their consulate to be notified of their
arrest and the right to confer with that consulate. 46 And at least some
38. Article 36, entitled "Communication and contact with nationals of the sending
[foreign] State," says in part:
With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State:
... [If the detainee] so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if,
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any
communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in
prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities
without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
...The rights referred to in [the above paragraphs] of this Article shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State,
subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under this Article are intended.
Id. art. 36.
39. Levit, supra note 34, at 619.
40. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24,
1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 [hereinafter Optional Protocol or Protocol].
41. U.N. Charter art. 92.
42. See id. art. 36.
43. Id. art. 94(1). Binding jurisdiction is by consent, either general or specific. The
United States withdrew from general jurisdiction in 1985, but remained subject to specific
jurisdiction with regard to the VCCR based on the optional protocol.
44. See id. art. 34.
45. See Curtis Bradley & Lori Fisler Damrosch, Medellin v. Dretke: Federalism and
InternationalLaw, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 667, 677 (2005) ("When the Vienna convention was being negotiated in the late 1960s, it was the United States that insisted that
there should be a compulsory dispute settlement system, and the U.S. took the lead role in
negotiating these dispute settlement provisions. The U.S. resisted the proposals of others
to water it down. The United States was the first state party to invoke the optional proto-

col under the Vienna Convention ....

This was in the Tehran Hostages Case brought in

1979.").
46. VCCR, supra note 35, art. 36. For United States citizens abroad, this means getting to meet with an American consular officer who informs the citizens' loved ones in the
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people think it can make a difference. Some consulates provide resources for indigent defendants, including attorneys. These attorneys can
be better qualified and more sensitive to the needs of a defendant who
cannot speak English than an attorney provided through a state's indi47
gent defense system.
This works well, except for when it doesn't. The problem comes when
the nation or its subdivision forgets to tell a defendant about his right to
consular notification. Especially what, if anything, should the defendant's
later remedy be, and when should he have to raise this issue, if it can be
individually raised at all. 48 This is a special problem in America, as much
of our criminal law is state and not federal law and we have strict rules in
our state courts about when certain arguments must be made. Under
state laws, defendants can procedurally default their rights if they do not
raise them in time. For example, if a state prosecutor withheld mitigating
evidence in a state trial, the defendant would have to raise that issue at
trial or risk forfeiting the right unless he could show good reasons-such
as ineffective assistance of counsel or the fact that the violation was concealed from him-for not promptly raising the claim.
Medellin and many of the VCCR cases deal with just this problem:
What happens when the defendants do not raise their rights in time because the state did not tell them about their rights, as it is the state's
obligation to do? (In effect, what happens when the state says, "Sorry I
didn't tell you about your rights; unfortunately you were supposed to
complain about that shortly after the time I didn't tell you about them.")
The Supreme Court took a look at this question and decided there was
no remedy. 49 Based on its reading of the VCCR, the defendant has no
recourse when an independent and adequate state procedural bar is in
effect.50 Therefore, if the defendant does not raise his right in time, he is
barred from raising it.51
The ICJ looked at the same question and disagreed with the Supreme
Court's reading of the VCCR. In the ICJ's view, failure to abide by the
terms of the VCCR entitled the defendant to judicial "review and reconsideration" in order to determine whether the failure to notify the defendant of a right to contact his consulate prejudiced his case, even when his
United States, provides guidance about the local legal system and information about attorneys, and performs periodic visits during incarceration or later imprisonment to ensure
that citizens are not subjected to mistreatment. Id.
47. See Choiniere v. United States, Nos. 3:07-CV-27 RM, 3:05-CR-56, 2009 WL
112585, at *7 (N.D. Ind. Jul. 14, 2009) ("The consulate can offer many services to the
detainee, including providing critical resources for legal representation and case investigation, conducting investigations, filing amicus briefs, locating witnesses and evidence from
the home country, and even intervening directly in a proceeding if necessary." (citing
Osagiede v. United States, 543 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2008))).
48. Of course, as an individual, he has no recourse to the ICJ. See U.N. Charter art.
34.
49. See Sanches-Llamas v. Oregon, 547 U.S. 331, 331 (2006).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., id.; Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); Levit, supra note 34, at 617.
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rights are otherwise defaulted.5 2 This remedy of "review and reconsideration" is not as drastic as it might be; 53 for example, the ICJ did not require the United States to apply the exclusionary rule, to overturn
alter sentences-it just called for judiconvictions, or even to necessarily
5 4
cial review and reconsideration.
The ICJ's decision involved about fifty Mexican nationals (including
Mr. Medellfn) who were convicted in a number of states throughout the
country. 55 Because only nations may bring cases in front of the ICJ, Mexico had to bring the case against the United States. It is referred to as
Case ConcerningAvena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United
States). 56 At that time, remember, the United States had agreed to the
jurisdiction of the ICJ in the Optional Protocol, and the United States
government admitted that it had been in breach of the notification provision. 57 Further, the United States, as a member of the United Nations,
had agreed to "undertake[ ] to comply" with ICJ decisions. 58 (Reflecting
perhaps our exceptionalism, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol on March 7, 2005, in a letter Condoleeza Rice sent to the
U.N. Secretary General.) 59 What was at issue was the appropriate rem60
edy for the breach.
In Avena, the ICJ found that the United States had violated the treaty
in forty-nine of the fifty-two cases. 61 It reiterated 62 that the proper remedy for a VCCR violation was "review and reconsideration" of the person's conviction and sentence conducted by the judicial system of the
country. 63 The United States had argued that executive clemency procedures provided sufficient review and reconsideration, but the64 ICJ disagreed, saying it was a job for the judicial branch in this case.
52. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States),
2004 I.C.J. 12, 65-66 (Mar. 31).
53. See id. at 23 (describing Mexico's demand that the United States "annull[ ] or otherwise depriv[e] of full force or effect the convictions and sentences").
54. Id. at 59-61.
55. Id. at 24-26.
56. Id. at 12.
57. VCCR, supra note 35, art. 1.
58. U.N. Charter art. 94.
59. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Addendum to ASK Insight, PresidentBush's Determination
Regarding Mexican Nationals and Consumer Convention Rights, ASIL INsIGHrs, Mar.
2005, http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/03/insightsO50309a.html.

60. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 58.
61. Id. at 71-72.
62. In the LaGrand Case, Germany initiated action in the ICJ against the United
States to prevent the execution of Walter LaGrand, a German national who botched a
bank robbery in Arizona. LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 475,
467-79 (June 27). Germany also instituted a suit in the United States Supreme Court. In
FederalRepublic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1999), the Supreme
Court declined to exercise original jurisdiction over Germany's claim, noting the tardiness
of the pleas. In 2001, after LaGrand was executed in an Arizona gas chamber, the ICJ held
that the Court's finding that LaGrand procedurally defaulted his VCCR rights violated the
VCCR. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 514-17.
63. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 59-70.
64. Id. at 65-66.
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I want to focus on two of the individuals involved in the Avena decision. I hope that in discussing these cases and talking about the rights of
these individuals, you do not misunderstand me as minimizing the odiousness of the crimes the two individuals committed, or the magnitude of the
state's interests in running its court systems.
Jos6 Ernesto Medellfn, an eighteen-year-old at the time of his crimes in
1993, was convicted in Texas of rape and murder based on his participation in a horrible, drunken gang-initiation in which a fourteen-year-old
and sixteen-year-old girl were raped and killed. 65 Medellfn personally
strangled one of the girls with her own shoelaces. 66 After his conviction,
and partly through his appeals, his lawyers realized that Texas had not
told Medellfn about his right to consular notification. 67 Texas courts
found that state rules procedurally barred Medellin's complaint about
this failure and that, in any case, the VCCR did not grant individuals the
right to raise VCCR claims to attack their sentences. 68 After Medellfn
filed a federal habeas writ, the Fifth Circuit also denied Medellfn a certificate of appealability, 69 in disagreement with provisional measures from
ICJ in the Avena case suggesting that courts should grant relief. 70 Based
in part on the applicable ICJ ruling in Avena, the Supreme Court granted
71
certiorari in Medellfin's case.
Now here let me pause to make an important point. The United States
clearly has one of the world's best criminal justice systems. Our courts
provide rights that other courts do not, and in reality, one would often be
hard-pressed to claim that a failure to grant consular consultation would
be likely to affect the actual result in a major crime. But there is a wrinkle: the United States is one of the few economically developed countries
in the world that has a death penalty. This ratchets up the concerns of
foreign states-one of their citizens may be executed. And we are also
one of the relatively few such countries that has a federalism system that
makes these decisions, by and large, state decisions and not national
ones.72 This can be tough for governments in countries without the death
penalty to understand or explain to their citizens. 73 Finally, American
65. Medellfn v. Cockrell, No. Civ.A.H-01-4078, 2003 WL 25321243, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
June 25, 2003).
66. Id.
67. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 274, 279 (5th Cir. 2004).
68. Id. at 279-80.
69. Id. at 281.
70. Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States),
Provisional Measures, 42 I.L.M. 309 (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=3&k=18&case=128&code=mvs&p3=3.
71. See Medellfn v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661-62 (2005).
72. Imagine if the Mexican State of Chihuahua refused to abide by an agreement that
the United States made with Mexico regarding the punishment of United States citizens.
73. Michael R. Steinmark, The Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States): A Mexican Perspective on the Fightfor ConsularRights, 10 L. &
Bus. REV. AM. 417, 421 (2004) ("The Mexican public views the denial of consular rights
not as a diplomatic or political issue, but rather as a human rights issue and source of
outrage. Their response has been compared to the American public's reaction to the 1994
caning of American teenager Michael Peter Fay in Singapore.").
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death penalty statutes allow evidence to be presented in mitigation of the
74
death penalty after the fact-finder, usually a jury, has determined guilt.
The mitigation phase has sparked much controversy in our own country;
scores of cases show that inexperienced lawyers do this very poorly.
Thus, despite our generally excellent legal system in America, capital
cases spark intense feelings and demand careful counsel in both the guilt
and sentencing phases of the trial.
Now, returning to my story, we were at the point where the Supreme
Court had granted a writ of certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit.
Shortly after the Court granted the writ, a portion of the sea changed.
On February 28, 2005, President George W. Bush, whose administration
had consistently evinced opposition to VCCR claims, 75 issued a memorandum to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, directing state courts to
"give effect to" the Avena decision without regard to state procedural
' 76
default rules, "in accordance with general principles of comity.
Medellin filed another petition for habeas in Texas state court, relying
on the presidential memo. Based on this filing, the United States Supreme Court dismissed the first writ of certiorari as improvidently
77
granted to allow Texas to act in response to the presidential directive.
Based in part on Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Breard v. Greene, Supreme Court cases holding that the state procedural bars trumped VCCR
rights, the Texas courts again denied habeas relief to Medellfn. 7 8 Medel79
lin again appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
Based on the earlier rulings, Medellfn could not strictly rely on the
VCCR; he had to rely on his status as a named party in the Avena decision under the protocol ceding VCCR jurisdiction to that court and the
80
President's memorandum stating the policy to give effect to the ruling.
Thus, in Medellin v. Texas, the Supreme Court had to determine (1) if
the Avena decision bound Texas (and any other state), allowing Medellfn
if any, the
to enforce directly the ICJ's decision, and (2) what legal effect,
81
President's memorandum had in Texas, or anywhere else.
In the Supreme Court, Texas won big. With respect to the question of
whether the ICJ had jurisdiction to enter its decision, binding American
courts to grant VCCR rights and review and reconsider cases, the Court
ruled that, though the VCCR and the Avena judgment created an international obligation, it was not directly enforceable as domestic law in state
court, reinforcing the wall between our international commitments and
74. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 2008).
75. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Bustillo v.
Johnson, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (No. 5-51), 2006 WL 271823, at *11-30 (arguing, among other
things, that Article 36 does not confer individually enforceable rights).
76. See Levit, supra note 34, at 622.
77. Medellfn v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661-62 (2005).
78. Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, 330-32, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
79. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1354-56 (2008).
80. Id. at 1356-57, 1367.
81. Id. at 1353.
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our domestic law.82 The ICJ's decision was not enforceable because the

Optional Protocol, which granted the ICJ jurisdiction, was not "self-executing," that is, the treaty required an implementing act by Congress
before a remedy in American courts would be provided (probably under
our habeas corpus statute). 83 Congress had passed no implementing legislation for either the VCCR or the Optional Protocol. 84 Therefore, al-

though the VCCR created obligations and in the Optional Protocol we
agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ regarding those obligations, the Avena decision did not provide Medellfn with a means to en85
force the ICJ ruling in domestic courts.
With respect to the question about the effect of President Bush's memorandum, the Court held that without congressional acquiescence, the
President's memorandum had no effect. 86 The President's foreign affairs
authority does not stretch so far as to allow him to compel state courts to
re-open final criminal judgments and set aside neutrally applicable state
87
laws in this case.
Appeals not to proceed with the execution poured into Texas. Attorney General Michael Mukasey and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
wrote to Governor Rick Perry pleading with him to abide by the Avena
decision. 88 The local paper, the Dallas Morning News, encouraged the
Governor to take action demonstrating respect for the Avena decision,
saying:
The international court's ruling can't be enforced, and the Supreme
Court has upheld the state's authority to proceed. But that doesn't
mean Mr. Perry is required to proceed. For the good of the country,
we join Attorney General Michael Mukasey and Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice in urging him to grant a stay of execution.
Yes, Mr. Perry can flex the state's judicial muscle and show the world
that Texans don't bow to the whims of some distant, obscure international court. But it would send an unequivocal message to all foreign
governments-especially Mexico-that this country doesn't stand by
its promises. They can justifiably point to Mr. Perry's example if
they decide not to be bound by this or other important treaties in the
82. Id. at 1356-67.

83. Id.
84. Id. at 1369-70.
85. The court held that ICJ decisions are neither binding nor enforceable. Id. at 1360.

This reiterated the holding in Breard v. Greene, "which held that Vienna Convention
claims are subject to procedural default rules, rather than by the ICJ's contrary decision in
Avena." Id. at 1355. Breard also discussed how the Antiterrorism and effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) may affect these claims as subsequent acts of Congress determined
to be in conflict with a treaty will control. See Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371, 376-77
(1998).
86. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1367-72.
87. Id. at 1371-72.
88. John R. Crook, Mexico Again Sues United States in ICJ; ICJ Directs United States
to Block Medellin Execution; U.S. Supreme Court Again Denies Relief; Texas Executes Medellin, 102 AM J. INT'L L. 860, 862 (2008).
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future.89
Despite these pleas, Governor Perry made clear Texas's position
shortly before Medellfn's execution. He vowed Texas would continue
with the execution without reviewing or reconsidering Medellfn's case:
The world court has no standing in Texas and Texas is not bound by a
ruling or edict from a foreign court.... It is easy to get caught up in
discussions of international law and justice and treaties. It's very important to remember that these individuals are on death row for killing our citizens. 90
Mr. Medellfn was executed by lethal injection on August 5, 2008. Appeals to delay in order to give Congress time to consider or enact legislation failed. In any case, it seems unlikely that Congress would have
enacted implementing legislation, as it has not done so since. 9'
On January 19, 2009, the ICJ held that "the United States did not discharge its obligation under the Court's Order of 16 July 2008, in the case
'92
of Mr. Jos6 Ernesto Medellin Rojas."
III.

TORRES

Osbaldo Torres, who is also named in Avena, was convicted in
93
Oklahoma for the 1993 murders of Francisco Morales and Maria Yanez.
Torres's co-defendant, George Ochoa, was identified by an eyewitness as
the actual gunman. 94 Thus, his case had less egregious facts than Medellfn's, though egregious nonetheless. Resolution of Torres's case predated
Medellfn.
Torres was convicted in state court and lost his direct appeal. 95 In 1999,
Torres filed for habeas relief in federal court, for the first time raising
Oklahoma's violation of his VCCR rights. 96 The Tenth Circuit refused to
grant him a certificate of appealability. 97 Torres appealed to the Supreme
89. Editorial, Gov. Perry Should Halt This Execution, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July
29, 2008, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontentldws/dnlopinionleditorials/stories/DNdeath_29edi.ART.state.Edition1.4d5d131. html.
90. Allan Turner & Rosanna Ruiz, Texas to World Court: Executions Are Still On /
Gov. Perry's Office Rebuffs Call to Let Medellin's Case be Reviewed, HOUSTON CHRON.,
July 17, 2008, at Al.
91. See Scott W. Lyons, Breach Without Remedy in the InternationalForum and the
Need for Self-Help: The Conundrum Resulting from the Medellfn Case, 13 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 73, 79-80 & n.31 (citing H.R. 6481, 110th Cong. § 1 (2008), which was not passed in
the 110th Congress).
92. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concern-

ing Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), para. 53 (order of Jan. 19, 2009),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14939.pdf.

93. Torres v. State, 962 P.2d 3, 7-8 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998).
94. Id. at 8.
95. See Torres v. State, 58 P.3d 214 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002); Torres, 962 P.2d at 3;
Torres v. State, No. PC-98-213 (Okla. Crim. App. Aug. 4, 1998) (unpublished order).
96. Torres v. Gibson, No. CIV-99-155-R (W.D. Okla. Aug. 23, 2000).
97. Torres v. Gibson, No. 00-6334 (10th Cir. Apr. 26, 2001) (unpublished order);
Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1148 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003). 1 must reveal that I sat on this
case and dissented from our opinion, but not on the grounds of the VCCR. Gibson, No.
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Court, which denied certiorari. 9 8 Justice Breyer filed an opinion saying
he would defer consideration of the petition because Avena was in progress and "given the international implications of the issues raised." 99
Torres's execution was set for May 18, 2004. In Avena, the ICJ expressed "great concern" about the execution date. 10 0 In response to
Avena, (remember this is before Medellin) the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) stayed the execution, allowing an evidentiary hearing on whether Torres was prejudiced by the lack of consular
notification.' 0 1 The same day the OCCA stayed Torres's execution.
Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry, commuted Torres's death sentence to
life without the possibility of parole. In doing so, (as Justice Stevens
noted) Governor Henry reasoned "(1) the United States signed the Vienna Convention, (2) that treaty is 'important in protecting the rights of
American citizens abroad,' (3) the ICJ ruled that Torres' rights had been
violated, and (4) the U.S. State Department urged his office to give care'10 2
ful consideration to the United States' treaty obligations.
The U.S. State Department, through a letter from the Legal Adviser to
the Secretary of State, William Howard Taft IV, had encouraged Governor Henry to take a close look at this matter. 10 3 Also, the Ambassador of
Mexico, the former United States Ambassador to Mexico, officials from
the European Union, and Ivy League law professors, among others, had
urged Oklahoma (either by addressing the Governor or signing amici
briefs to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals) to respect the ICJ
04
ruling.1
In his Medellin concurrence, Justice Stevens encouraged Texas to consider Oklahoma's response: "The cost to Texas of complying with Avena
would be minimal, particularly given the remote likelihood that the violation of the Vienna Convention actually prejudiced Jos6 Ernesto Medellfn.
10 5
It is a cost that the State of Oklahoma unhesitatingly assumed.'

00-6334 (unpublished order denying COA); Mullin, 317 F.3d at 1162-68 (Henry, J.,
dissenting).
98. Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003).
99. Id. at 1041.
100. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1375 n.4 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
101. See Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442, 2004 WL 3711623, at *1 (Okla. Crim. App.
May 13, 2004).
102. See Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1375 n.4; see also Press Release, Office of Gov. Brad
Henry, Gov. Henry Grants Clemency to Death Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.ok.governor/display-article.php?article id.=301&articletype=l.
103. See Heather L. Finstuen, From the World Court to Oklahoma Court: The Significance of Torres v. State for International Court of Justice Authority, Individual Rights, and
the Availability of Remedy in Vienna Convention Disputes, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 255, 271

(2005).
104. See Janet Koven Levit, A Tale of InternationalLaw in the Heartland:Torres and the
Role of State Courts in Transnational Legal Conversation, 12 TuLSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

163, 181 (2004).
concurring).
105. Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1375 (Stevens, J.,
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SO, WHERE DID THIS LEAVE US?

The Supreme Court said we have an international obligation, but certain officials in Texas did not seem to care, even when the message came
(admittedly in a legally unenforceable form) from a former Texas Governor through a former Texas Supreme Court Justice. Merely agreeing to
take a second look, in any of several ways, as Oklahoma did and other
states have done, most likely would have still resulted in Mr. Medellfn's
execution, but at a considerably cheaper cost in terms of world opinion,
not to mention litigation expenses. Where are we? Several places-but
let us take the easy one first.
The Supreme Court ruled that the President was out of line in his unilateral attempt to direct state court systems to comply with a treaty obligation-an obligation that his Administration had never considered a
self-executing one. 10 6 Given the Court's conclusion that the protocol was
not self-executing (a decision which still engenders considerable debate),
this decision was clearly correct. The President was without authority to
act in this way, as even John Yoo, who is not a shrinking violet when it
comes to presidential power, agreed.1 0 7 Just about everyone agrees here.
But then things start to go South (or is it West?). The Cato Institute
heralds the case as a great victory in "resisting the tide of transnational
global governance."'1 0 8 This is a somewhat curious conclusion in an otherwise fine (if a bit cynical) article about the case. It is curious because
the United States ratified the VCCR, largely to protect its own citizens,
and the State Department itself concluded even before the 1969 ICJ protocol that the Convention was "considered entirely self-executive and
does not require any implementing or complementing legislation." 10 9 It
is hardly a matter of a one-world government to voluntarily ratify such a
treaty that makes so much sense (as we shall see more evidence of in a
moment).
Cato's conclusion is curious from another perspective, too. The Institute favors some globalization, just not human rights globalization:
"While economic globalization brings opportunity and freedom to different parts of the world, what could be called 'political globalization' seeks
to substitute the views of elite cosmopolitan technocrats for the consent
of each nations governed." 110
It strikes me as odd that the cosmopolitan technocrats who brought us
NAFTA and the WTO bring opportunity and freedom-along with the
domestic tax changes that have become necessary to implement these
106. Id. at 1367-72.
107. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Constitutional and International Law Scholars in Support of Respondent State of Texas, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984),
2007 WL 4983975, at *7-11 (filed by John Yoo and Erwin Chemerinsky, among others).
108. Shapiro, supra note 33, at 102.
109. Id. at 83 n.109 (citing S. Exec. Rep. No. 91-9, at 5 (1969)).
110. Id. at 102.
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paradigms'-but the cosmopolitan technocrats in our Department of
State who want to receive, and hence must give, consular notification, are
2
for transnational global governance."
Professor McGuinness noted the joy of some exceptionalist scholars at
the Supreme Court's strong expression of the doctrine in Sanchez-Llamas, a Medellin precursor:
Sovereigntist observers of the Court initially hailed Sanchez-Llamas
as a defeat for internationalism in American jurisprudence and thus
a triumph for exceptionalism. What could be a more significant rejection of international regulation of individual rights in the United
States than an explicit rejection of the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) interpretation of judicial enforceability of an individual
right arising from a treaty to which the U.S. is a party and with
which
13
the U.S. has expressly and consistently agreed to comply?
But she goes on to conclude that "such celebrations ... may be misplaced
and may misunderstand the dimensions of American exceptionalism at
issue in the VCCR cases."' 14 Her conclusion could apply equally to those
heralding the Medellin decision.
Indeed, other voices, both "liberal" and "conservative," seem to agree
that the VCCR cases open up new opportunities for the states to have a
role in foreign policy decisions not preempted by the federal government. 1 5 One such scholar argues that the decision reached by
Oklahoma's Governor may have revealed the most practical and feasible
way to accommodate the internationalizing pressure of globalization with
a continuing federal system of dual sovereignties.' 1 6 Agreeing that the
consequences of Texas's actions in these cases might affect all Americans
and that this is a "legitimate concern," he argues that it may not be necessary to speak with one voice on all decisions, that internationalism does
not necessarily mean nationalism, and that there may be more than one
way to skin a cat. 117 It is laudable to protect American citizens.
Oklahoma and Texas citizens-indeed citizens in all states and United
States entities-are largely indistinguishable when they travel abroad.
111. In 2004, President Bush and Congress scrapped a law that allowed certain international corporations to get special tax rates, based on EU complaints to the WTO. However, President Bush replaced these "tax increases" with fresh tax breaks worth $140
billion. See Bush Shakes Up US Corporate Taxes, BBC NEWS, Oct. 22, 2004, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3946183.stm.
112. In an article lamenting the United States's decision to keep lumber duties in the
face of an adverse NAFTA ruling, Daniel Ikenson, an analyst at the Cato Institute stated
that: "America's growing disdain for its international trade commitments is a troubling
development. Itwill now be that much easier for U.S. trade partners to break the rules
and disregard their own commitments." Daniel Ikenson, Felling NAFTA, CATO INST.
COMMENT., Oct. 24, 2005, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/articles/as-ikenson.pdf. It seems
this argument would apply equally to other issues like consular notification.
113. Margaret E. McGuinness, Sanchez-Llamas, American Human Rights Exceptionalism and the VCCR Norm Portal, 11 LEWIs & CLARK L. REV. 47, 50 (2007).

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Julian G. Ku, GubernatorialForeign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2398-99 (2006).
ld. at 2414-15.
Id. at 2413-14.
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The diphthongs give some things away. State governors should be able to
figure out enforcement mechanisms and procedures that meet international obligations on their own.118
Further, to the extent that the goal might be that we should keep our
word, Dean Levit notes in a "from the ground up" view that the interactive process that is international law has resulted in massive support for
and compliance with the VCCR. 1 19 The State Department knows that its
embassy employees are primary beneficiaries of the similar Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), that our citizens are the primary beneficiaries of the VCCR, and that together these treaties provide
important protections for our citizens and representatives abroad. Its
outreach to state and local law enforcement has snowballed, delivering
over one million pieces of consular notification instructional material, including a Consular Notification and Access Reference Card that mirrors
the famed Miranda cards I used to use in my office when I was Attorney
General. States like California have passed laws requiring peace officers
to comply; state officials, including, notably, the Attorney General of
Texas, have disseminated guides to consular notification (indeed, the
Texan guide seems to be a model for other states)1 2 0 Dean Levit concludes: "For the most part, officials now notify foreign nationals of consular rights.' 121 And that is a good thing for domestic law enforcement,
too. Even though individuals cannot directly enforce this international
obligation when it is procedurally barred, failure to comply with the
VCCR might affect the voluntariness of an interrogation or waiver, as
Justice Ginsburg has suggested; it also might contribute to an ineffective
22
assistance of counsel claim, as the Seventh Circuit has recently ruled.'
118. Id. at 2413. Professor McGuinness is downright optimistic about the future:
As federal states in the United States continue to expand the ways in which
they carry out foreign policies, we can expect them to increasingly take the

lead in internalizing external human rights norms. That is not to suggest that
it will be a smooth, linear progression from American political and judicial
exceptionalism to adoption of international standards. The persistence of the
death penalty and the current U.S. [Bush] administration's attitude toward

the Geneva conventions and customary international law governing detainee
treatment demonstrate that significant backsliding from higher international
standards can occur.
McGuinness, supra note 113, at 64.

119. Janet Koven Levit, A Tale of International Law in the Heartland: Torres and the
Role of State Courts in Transnational Legal Conversation, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
163, 178-87 (2004).
120. Victoria M. Lee, Giving State and Local Law Enforcement the Benefit of the
Doubt: How to Ensure VCCR Compliance Without Judicial Remedies, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 609,
638-43 (2009).
121. Janet Koven Levit, The Legitimacy of Delegating Lawmaking to International Institutions: The International Court of Justice and Foreign Nationals on Death Row in the U.S.:
Does Medellfn Matter?, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 617, 631 (2008).
122. Osagiede v. United States, 543 F.3d 399, 407-12 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Indeed, Justice

Ginsburg stated that it was 'critical' for her that the defendant did not raise an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim along with his direct Vienna Convention claim." (citing
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 363-64 & n.3 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., concurring))).
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We are in a globalized world, where it will continue to be important to
work with other nations and to enter international treaties, conventions,
and accords. If our nation gives its word, should states seek avenues to
go along when state interests can still be met in the process?
Interestingly, and encouragingly-and I saved this for the end-Texas
itself softened its position in its Brief in Opposition to Medellin's stay of
execution in the Supreme Court. As Lucy Reed, President of the American Society of Internal Law, an organization to which every American
Secretary of State since its founding has belonged, noted, referring to
Texas's brief in Medellin: "Texas 'acknowledge[d] the international sensitivities presented by the Avena ruling'

. . .

and stated that it would 'as an

act of comity' take steps to provide other Avena defendants with 'review
and reconsideration' of their claims of prejudice under the Vienna Con123
vention on the merits."'
Specifically, Texas said that in the future it would "join with the defense in asking the reviewing court to address the claim of prejudice on
the merits."'1 24 Thus, although Texas would not-and did not have tocomply with the President's directive based on comity in Medellin, it certainly noticed the national and international outcry. Even though it had
argued that its system had complied with the ICJ's regimen (a conclusion
hotly disputed, to be sure), in the aftermath of this troubling case, Texas
seems to have taken the lead, not for transnational governance, but for
complying with our valid international obligations-on the basis of
comity.
Medellin was truly a difficult case, coming at a convergence of national
values: the value of keeping international obligations with a state's value
of running its criminal courts as it sees fit under our constitutional umbrella. The fact that it was a death penalty case probably sharpened the
swords on both sides. A new way to read treaties developed, a President
was reigned in, but in the end, the strange winner was comity after all.
Again, Professor McGuinness noted: "[T]he United States gains more
than it loses from participation in the international human rights system,
and . . . disengagement from the rest of the world is not a viable option. '' 125 We are a "melting pot" of immigrants; we travel back to our

ancestral homelands in record numbers; we are a nation of travelers. The
VCCR teaches other nations that they cannot take an American and
throw him or her into a cell and not tell us. These rights disproportionately help us since Americans travel all over the world.
I said the winner-if states abide by the VCCR-was comity, but of
course, there is another. For some years ago, the great Hugo Black noted
in an Indian treaty case that "Great nations, like great men, should keep
123. Lucy F. Reed, Society Resources Brought to Bear on Medellfn, ASIL NEWSLE-rrER
(Am. Soc'y of Int'l L., Wash. D.C.), July/Sept. 2008, at 15, available at http://www.asil.org/
files/pres080922.pdf.
124. Brief of Respondent in Opposition at 17-18, Medellfn v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 290
(2008) (No. 08-5573, 08A98).
125. McGuinness, supra note 113, at 64.
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their word. 1 1 26 When our federal government makes an international
commitment, there is something to be said for states trying to honor the
agreement.

126. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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